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ABSTRACT The model of the human neurocognitive ar-
chitecture proposed by evolutionary psychologists is based on
the presumption that the demands of hunter-gatherer life
generated a vast array of cognitive adaptations. Here we
present an alternative model. We argue that the problems
inherent in the biological markets of ancestral hominids and
their mammalian predecessors would have required an adap-
tively f lexible, on-line information-processing system, and
would have driven the evolution of a functionally plastic
neural substrate, the neocortex, rather than a confederation
of evolutionarily prespecified social cognitive adaptations. In
alignment with recent neuroscientific evidence, we suggest
that human cognitive processes result from the activation of
constructed cortical representational networks, which ref lect
probabilistic relationships between sensory inputs, behavioral
responses, and adaptive outcomes. The developmental con-
struction and experiential modification of these networks are
mediated by subcortical circuitries that are responsive to the
life history regulatory system. As a consequence, these net-
works are intrinsically adaptively constrained. The theoretical
and research implications of this alternative evolutionary
model are discussed.
An extensive literature underscores the enormous functional
plasticity of the neocortex (1–3), a distinguishing characteristic
of mammals (1, 4). This evidence supports the position that
cortical representational features are systematically con-
structed by the dynamic interaction between environmentally
derived neural activity and intrinsic neural growth mechanisms
(3). The information-processing capacities of the neocortex are
largely constructed by the problem domains confronting the
individual throughout development, and remain modifiable
throughout the life history. This neurobiological constructivist
account of the human neurocognitive architecture contrasts
sharply with the account of evolutionary psychologists, who
conceive of the mind as a confederation of information-
processing adaptations, each of which evolved in response to
a problem posed by Pleistocene selection pressures (5).
Numerous methodological problems and theoretical f laws
call the validity of the evolutionary psychological paradigm
into question (6). Its proponents claim that three categories of
evolved mechanisms support human intelligence—domain-
specific mechanisms, domain-general mechanisms, and an
integrative circuitry—but their research programs have fo-
cused exclusively on generating evidence for postulated do-
main-specific mechanisms. The standard protocol involves
assessing subjects’ relative performance on tasks that vary in
the degree to which they correspond to an inferred ancestral
adaptive problem. Although results that align with predicted
patterns of reasoning performance have been interpreted as
providing support for the hypothesized domain-specific mech-
anisms under investigation, the absence of a definitive analysis
(i.e., a method that parses out the possible contributions of the
other postulated mechanisms, specific and general), makes
such conclusions, at best, speculative.
Within the theoretical framework of evolutionary psychol-
ogy, the critical problem of the adaptive selection of behavior
rests heavily on the integrative circuitry that is presumed to
engage the appropriate domain-specific mechanism. Yet, like
the postulated domain-general mechanisms, this circuitry re-
mains theoretically unconsidered and empirically unexplored
within the paradigm.
An obvious source of information that might illuminate
these hypothetical mechanisms is the extensive neuroscientific
literature on the biological basis of adaptive behavior in
mammals. But evolutionary psychologists have suggested that
analysis at the implementation level (i.e., investigation of the
neural correlates of behavior) is not mandatory for the study
of cognitive adaptations (7, 8). In our view, this failure to
reconcile theoretical claims with neurobiological data has
veiled from evolutionary analyses the functional organization
of the information-processing circuitries that comprise the
human neurocognitive architecture. Indeed, the alternative,
neurobiologically based model we present here compels a
reconceptualization of the domain-specificydomain-generaly
integrative circuitry constructs as they are currently employed
by evolutionary behavioral scientists.
Reconceptualizing the Nature of Social Adaptive Problems
and Solutions
Evolutionary psychologists have appropriately acknowledged
the importance of adaptive social behavior to the inclusive
fitness of hominids. Recognizing the complexity of the ances-
tral social environment, they propose that humans have in-
herited a vast array of cognitive adaptations that facilitated
social negotiations. Examples include postulated domain-
specific adaptations to detect ‘‘cheaters’’ (9); to ‘‘have an
appetite to be recognized and valued for [one’s] individuality
or exceptional attributes’’; and to ‘‘be motivated to cultivate
specialized skills, attributes, and habitual activities that in-
crease [one’s] relative irreplaceability,’’ etc. (10). In contrast,
we suggest that a functionally plastic neocortex was the evo-
lutionary solution to the adaptive navigation of ancestral social
environments. [In fact, other researchers have proposed that
the evolutionary appearance of the neocortex in mammals was
the consequence of navigating fluctuating environments (11–
14)].
In game theoretic models of biological market dynamics,
various classes of traders exchange commodities to their
mutual benefit (15–17). Biological market models are charac-
terized by competition within trader classes by contest or
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outbidding, conflicts over the exchange value of commodities,
and preference for partners offering the highest value (16, 17).
They have significantly greater correspondence to most social
exchange phenomena than earlier game theoretic conceptu-
alizations, but these models only begin to suggest the multi-
dimensional, dynamic character of hominid biological markets.
An individual can be engaged in numerous cooperative and
competitive relationships simultaneously, with one or more
other individuals who are themselves concurrently engaged in
various cooperative and competitive constellations within the
same group. Cooperative alliances between individuals can be
based on one or more of any number of different commodities
or services, and a cooperator for the attainment of one goal
can be a competitor for another. The intrinsically f luctuating
nature of critical market variables further increases the com-
plexity of problem-solving in the market environment. The
value of an individual as a cooperative partner can change
directly as a function of age, injury, pregnancy, the formation
of new alliances, andyor changing cooperative task priorities,
and it can change indirectly as a function of shifting alliances,
power centers, and numerous other perturbations in the
greater market. In the relatively closed biological markets of
ancestral hominid populations, a single social behavioral out-
put, the product of a moment’s cognitive processing, could
have profound long-term (even dire) consequences for the
individuals involved in the interaction, and produce reverber-
ating changes in the market that would impact on subsequent
social exchange decisions.
The temporally dynamic, individually specific cost-benefit
analyses that any given social behavioral decision entails
renders each information-processing problem an essentially
novel and ephemeral construction, not an evolutionarily static
social adaptive problem that might be captured by selection
processes. The critical issue for evolutionary behavioral sci-
entists, then, concerns the nature of the neural information-
processing substrate capable of solving social survival and
reproductive problems given the extent of fluctuation in the
biological market environment and one’s immediate position
within it. The neuroscientific literature suggests that the plastic
properties of the neocortex provided the requisite substrate: a
matrix for the construction of representational networks.
The critical adaptive feature of cortical representational
networks is that they allow for the functional linkage of
information derived from the external environment and the
internal milieu, with the predicted utility—for an
individual—of a given behavior in a particular environment.
The construction, modification, and ultimate utilization of
representational networks is described in detail in the subse-
quent section of this paper. Here, we will simply note that they
inform, and are informed by, subcortical structures that select
and sequence behaviors, facilitating, on line, the adaptive
guidance of the behavior of an individual, in a specific envi-
ronmental situation, and in a specific internal state.
Cortical representational networks are modified on the basis
of experience as a function of the newly estimated adaptive
utility to the individual of an existing inferential circuit. They
automatically reconfigure information that is directly relevant
to a problem-solving task. Representational networks have
associative properties. Consequently, representations that
might have been established as components of circuits used in
one domain can be accessed and influenced by circuitries that
support problem-solving in other domains. Moreover, they
form metarepresentational hierarchies that can support ab-
stract inferential processes, and complex, temporally ordered
networks that can support historical records. In brief, cortical
representational networks constitute the type of information
databaseyprocessing circuitry that is required for the adaptive
guidance of behavior in changing environments.
Mammalian Behavioral Intelligence in Phylogenetic and
Systematic Perspective
The sine qua non of behavioral intelligence systems is the
capacity to predict the future—to model likely behavioral
outcomes in the service of inclusive fitness. This logic is already
evident, in a primitive sense, in Escherichia coli: information
transduced by environmental sensors directs behavioral re-
sponses in a manner that increases the probability of the
attainment of bioenergetic resources in the next moment (18,
19).
Centralized nervous systems are characterized by numerous
design features that enhance predictive capacity. An adapta-
tion found in even the simplest centralized nervous system is
a region of highly plastic tissue specialized for the purpose of
instantiating representations (i.e., neural activation vectors
that convey information). This substrate, acting in concert with
the integrated system in which it is situated, allows for the
retention of essential information about the probabilistic
relationships between specific sensory inputs, behavioral re-
sponses, and the adaptive value of the outcomes of these
behaviors as established by homeostaticylife history regulatory
system components.
Recent work exploring mechanisms of associative learning
in bees is illustrative (20–23). During foraging, bees associate
the location, shape, symmetry, color, and odor of flowers with
‘‘rewards’’ (feedback to homeostatic regulatory centers) (22,
24, 25). In the standard classical conditioning paradigm, when
arbitrary stimuli with no intrinsic reward values are repeatedly
associated in time with rewarding objects (unconditioned
stimuli), they then function as rewarding stimuli. After this
association has developed, the previously neutral stimuli (now
the conditioned stimuli) elicit a conditioned response. For
example, bees develop a proboscis-extension response as a
conditioned response to an odor (i.e., the scent of a flower)
after a single pairing of the odor (conditioned stimulus) with
a biologically salient sucrose reward (unconditioned stimulus),
the nectar in a flower.
Foraging patches represent a fluctuating environment (dif-
ferent species of flowers come and go, various environmental
factors determine which type of flowers currently yield the
most concentrated nectar, etc.). The adaptive problem of
meeting nutritional needs in an uncertain environment did not
drive the evolution of an array of discrete stimulus-specific
neural adaptations for nectar foraging in the honeybee.
Rather, it promoted the evolution of a system that could
construct an environmentally appropriate behavioral guidance
subsystem for foraging. The key components are a core
instinctual mechanism that captured the evolutionarily stable
regularities of the organism-environment foraging problem, a
functionally plastic central nervous system substrate, and a
neural mechanism that mediates the construction and modi-
fication of adaptive representational networks in the plastic
substrate.
In the honeybee, the latter function is served by the ventral
unpaired median cell of maxillary neuromere 1 (VUMmx1),
an interneuron in the suboesophageal ganglion (a homeostatic
regulatory system component) (22, 24). VUMmx1 (an octo-
paminergic neuron) projects widely to associatively plastic
brain regions involved in odor processing (notably, the mush-
room bodies and the lateral protocerebral lobe). In addition to
mediating the instinctual proboscis-extension response (the
adaptive behavior) to nectar (the fitness resource assessed by
the homeostatic regulatory component), VUMmx1 mediates
the acquisition of the conditioned response to the adaptively
relevant novel stimulus features of the environment. It does so
by constructing a network connection between the represen-
tation of the novel stimulus and the representation that is
instinctually linked to the adaptive behavior. The strength of
this neural link is subsequently increased or decreased (man-
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ifested as synaptic changes in the representational network) on
the basis of the bee’s experience of resource acquisition (as
registered by the homeostatic component) after network ac-
tivation.
In a model of this system, Montague et al. (26) have used a
predictive form of Hebbian learning to elucidate VUMmx1
octopaminergic modulation of the representational networks
that regulate optimal foraging behavior in the honeybee. The
VUMmx1-based model is expressed as a computer simulation
of a bee foraging for nectar in a novel environment of blue and
yellow flowers. The mean return from blue and yellow patches
in the environment is equivalent, but the variability of nectar
concentration differs; color is the only predictor of nectar
delivery. The bee, which has a cone of vision that senses
changes in the percentages of flowers, computes a trajectory
through the environment in a manner that optimizes its nectar
harvest. The model, based on the neural substrate and tested
in a simulation of bee flight, accounts for a wide range of
experimental results from studies of bee learning during
foraging. The findings illustrate how the VUMmx1 neuron
provides the bee with a representational inferential circuit for
the prediction of reward that is updated in real time. By
instantiating changes in the synapses of relevant representa-
tional networks in the mushroom bodies and lateral protoce-
rebral lobe—driven by adaptive outcomes—VUMmx1 has
constructed, on line, an inferential circuit that promotes
fitness-enhancing behavior in uncertain environments.
A large body of evidence suggests that the same general plan
characterizes the mammalian behavioral intelligence system. A
direct analog exists between the VUMmx1 octopaminergically
modulated construction of adaptive inferential circuits in the
mushroom bodies and protocerebral lobes of bees, and do-
paminergically modulated construction of inferential circuits
in the cortex of mammals. A notable difference is that, whereas
the bee system relies on an invariant instinctual mechanism to
establish the adaptive utility of a representational ‘‘inferential’’
circuit, the mammalian system we describe below ultimately
arrives at these assessments by correspondence with homeo-
staticylife history regulatory systems and functionally related
subcortical structures. It is important to note that humans and
other mammals do have instinctual mechanisms that, in the
earliest stages of postnatal development, invariantly generate
behavior (e.g., sucking and grasping reflexes); but, concomi-
tant with the massive increase in cortical volume that begins in
the immediate postnatal period, instinctual behavior is quickly
supplanted by adaptively learned behavior.
Adaptive learning requires that relevant sensory and motor
representations of the world be established, and that they then
be combined to form fitness-enhancing sequences of behavior
(27). In mammals, including humans, these coordinated func-
tions are centrally supported by the basal ganglia (described
below), in communication with the hypothalamus (the com-
plex of nuclei that constitutes the core of the homeostaticylife
history regulatory system), the thalamus (the major sensory
‘relay’ center of the brain), and the cortex (see Fig. 1).
The basal ganglia, unlike most components of the motor
system, have no direct connections with the spinal cord; rather,
their primary input is from widespread areas of the cortex, and
their output is directed back to the premotor and prefrontal
cortices by way of the thalamus. Three pathways originating in
the basal ganglia—the mesolimbic, nigrostriatal, and meso-
cortical dopamine systems—are implicated for critical roles in
the construction, modification, and activation of cortical rep-
resentations that adaptively guide behavior. The nuclei that
give rise to these pathways (the ventral tegmental area, and the
substantia nigra pars compacta) are in direct correspondence
with the hypothalamus.
A 40-year research literature supports the role of the
mesolimbic dopamine system in ‘‘reinforcing’’ behaviors that
lead to motivational state changes (28, 29). In the past decade,
an increasing body of research has clarified a more compre-
hensive role of diffuse dopaminergic systems in adaptive
FIG. 1. Schematic representation of the principal brain regions comprising the neurocognitive architecture described in text. In the alternative
evolutionary model we propose, basal ganglial circuitries, in correspondence with the life history regulatory system, support the developmental
construction, and subsequent experiential modification of cortical representational networks. The neural correlates of cognitive and behavioral
processes are activation patterns in specific representational networks. The basal ganglia play a central role in the selection and sequencing of
behavior and cognitive activity. VTA, ventral tegmental area; NA, nucleus accumbens; SN, substantia nigra; GP, globus pallidus.
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behavioral guidance (27, 30, 31). Recent findings suggest that
the marking of stimuli that serve as predictors of reward is
mediated by activity in substantia nigra neurons (the cell
bodies of the nigrostriatal pathway) (32), and that the tracking
of behavioral progress toward the attainment of a reward is
mediated by activity in ventral striatal neurons (33). A recently
developed theoretical framework, based on physiological find-
ings and supported by a neurocomputational model of choice
behavior, suggests how dopamine systems might be correcting
predictions of reward via signals sent to their cortical and
subcortical targets (34).
In mammals, including humans, the formation of fitness-
enhancing sequences of behavior is facilitated by a neural
circuitry that begins with nigrostriatal dopaminergic inputs to
the caudate-putamen (the striatum). This circuit continues
through an output nucleus (the globus pallidus pars internalis)
to the thalamus, and then on to cortical action and planning
areas. As noted above, striatal components of the basal ganglia
receive inputs from almost the entire cortex (i.e., sensory,
motor, and association representational areas), including mas-
sive projections from the prefrontal cortex (planning and
action areas). These findings suggest that the basal ganglia play
an important role in planning and cognition. Moreover, there
is convergence in neuron number from the input stage of the
basal ganglia (i.e., the striatum) to the output stage (i.e., the
globus pallidus pars internalis) further suggesting that the basal
ganglia integrate various types of information to either plan or
select an action from many competing possibilities represented
in cortex. A functional neurocomputational model provides
strong support for this contention (27). Additional findings
now suggest that mesocortical dopamine neurons, which
project to prefrontal cortical planning areas, facilitate the
attentional processes required for adaptive learning by sus-
taining activation in representations corresponding to novel
and adaptively relevant conditioned stimuli (30).
The model we have presented is preliminary. We have
focused on circuitries that we believe to be critically important
in the construction, modification, and utilization of adaptive
cortical representations, but have omitted other important
components for the sake of brevity (e.g., the hippocampus and
limbic loop of the basal ganglia). One final system that requires
inclusion is the amygdaloid complex, which mediates the
acquisition of conditioned emotional responses.
The amygdaloid complex is composed of multiple individual
nuclei. Most these project to various cortical areas and sub-
cortical regions involved in the processing of affective infor-
mation; one (the central nucleus) projects to the hypothalamus
and brain stem to initiate endocrine and autonomic nervous
systems responses. Cognitive and behavioral responses are
mediated via projections from the basolateral nucleus to the
ventral striatum and the prefrontal cortex. These areas are
thought to be involved in the circuits that interface between the
processing of emotionally salient stimuli and planned behavior
(35); indeed, reciprocal connections between the basolateral
nucleus and prefrontal cortical areas have been implicated in
the assignment of affective markers that inform choice behav-
ior (36).
DISCUSSION
In this paper, we argue that the biological marketplace was
ancestrally, and is now, an environment of incessant flux. We
have suggested that for social mammals, in particular for
ancestral members of our species, the uncertainty inherent in
the marketplace constituted a selection pressure for an adap-
tively plastic neural substrate, the neocortex. We have further
suggested that this substrate serves as a matrix for the con-
struction of adaptive representational networks that have
intrinsic cost-benefit structure, and that can support on-line
behavioral and cognitive processes.
The striato-pallido-thalamo-cortical system that drives the
construction and modification of adaptive representational
networks supports operant and classical conditioning pro-
cesses; as such, it has been dismissed in the evolutionary
psychology literature as a domain-general mechanism. It is
critical to note, however, that this system is never functioning
in domain-general manner: it is primarily responsive to the
motivational state of the individual, as established by feedback
signals to the life history regulatory system, and is concurrently
responsive to evolutionarily prespecified and adaptively sig-
nificant novel features of the environment. The design of this
system promotes the generation of adaptive behavior without
requiring en bloc prespecification of the range of individual
and environmental variables that might constitute any given
adaptive problem. Moreover, the system is configured such
that the ‘‘integrative circuitry’’ is intrinsic to the ‘‘domain-
specific’’ problem-solving mechanisms.
Evolutionary psychologists have suggested that the meta-
adaptive problem of appropriate behavior selection (the so-
called ‘‘frame problem’’) (8) was solved by a constellation of
domain-specific mechanisms that are in some way appropri-
ately selected for by an integrativeyarbitrative circuitry. We
suggest that the solution to this problem is to be found in the
design features of the evolved intelligence system we have
presented here.
We believe that this alternative model of the human neu-
rocognitive architecture will prove to be a fertile source of
research predictions across various disciplines. We offer one
example that bridges evolutionary psychology and mainstream
cognitive and social psychology literatures.
Because the foundational representational features of cor-
tex are constructed by the problem domains confronting the
individual in development, we should expect that differences
in the biological market constraints confronting individuals in
early childhood might generate significant differences in cog-
nitive reasoning style. The disparity in degree of competition
for family resources between firstborns and laterborns pro-
vides a relevant test case. The effects of birth order on various
dimensions of personality are well documented (37). For
example, on average, laterborns demonstrate a greater ten-
dency to rebel against authority than firstborns. In a recent
meta-analysis of the leaders of scientific revolutions, Sulloway
(37) found that laterborns are much more likely to be the
leaders of radical scientific revolutions than firstborns—a
difference that he attributed to a more rebellious temperament
and a personality style that promotes an ‘‘openness to expe-
rience.’’ We suggest an alternative explanation in terms of
market-driven differences in cognitive reasoning style. Con-
fronted with stiff competition for family resources, laterborns
should be prompted to assess various alternative resource
options, and to make comparisons across available alterna-
tives. We would therefore predict that, all other market
variables being equal, laterborns should have a greater capacity
for inductive reasoning than firstborns.
If correct, the alternative model we have proposed is likely
to have far-reaching consequences for research in evolutionary
psychology, and various life and social science disciplines.
Although the full ramifications are beyond the scope of this
paper, it is clear that the wide range of individual differences
reported in various literatures dealing with cognition may no
longer be dismissed as experimental ‘‘noise,’’ or deviation from
species-typical design. Rather, the model we have outlined
emphasizes individual differences as the product of an evolved
self-adapting system, a neurocognitive architecture that is
unique by design.
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